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Davis and Palmer: Tax Law
A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

Special]

XXIII. TAX LAW
A.

Tax Rate for Value Added to Coal

The issue of the appropriate tax rate for value added in the production of
coal was addressed in Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey.547 Justice
McHugh wrote that
[t]he production of coal, for the purposes of W.Va. Code, 11-13-2a
(1971), ends when the coal is reduced to possession on the
surface. The screening, crushing, and washing of raw coal in
tipples to remove the impurities from the coal so processed is an
activity properly classified as manufacturing, compounding, or
preparing for sale, profit or commercial use an article, substance,
or commodity and, therefore, the value added to coal by such
processing is properly subject to the tax rate set by W.Va. Code,
11-13-2b (1971).'54
B.

ChallengingValidity of Tax
In Tony P. Sellitti Construction Co. v. Caryl, 549 Justice McHugh held that
[w]here a required tax return is not filed or a required tax is not
paid due to a good-faith challenge to the validity of such
requirement(s), the failure to file or to pay "is due to reasonable
cause and not due to willful neglect," and a court, upon an appeal
of a tax assessment in such a case, should vacate the addition to
tax or any tax penalty authorized by W.Va. Code, 11-10-18 or -19,
as amended, even if the
tax and interest portions of the tax
15 0
assessment are affirmed.

C.

Taxing PropertyLeased by County

Justice McHugh examined the ability of a county to tax the leasehold
interest in property owned by the county, but leased to a private business in the
case of In re Maier.155 1 The court held that
[a] county assessment for ad valorem tax purposes of a leasehold
1547

280 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981).

1548

Id at Syl. Pt. 3.

1549

408 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1991).

1550

Id at Syl. Pt. 7.

1551

319 S.E.2d 410 (W. Va. 1984).
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interest in county property was not prohibited by the provisions of
W.Va. Code, 13-2C-15 [1963], of the Industrial Development
Bond Act, W.Va. Code, 13-2C-1 [1963], et seq., (now known as
the "Industrial Development and Commercial Development Bond
Act"), which section sets forth certain exemptions from taxation,
where the leasehold in question was established under the
Industrial Development Bond Act with the county as lessor of the
property and a private corporation as lessee, and where a
commercial1552warehouse facility was operated upon the property by
the lessee.
D.

Service Fees
15 53
In Ellison v. City of Parkersburg,
Justice McHugh determined the

validity of an ordinance imposing a solid waste fee on residents. The court held:
Parkersburg Code Sec. 955.07 [1979], which provides in pertinent
part: "(a) Each property owner or occupant of a residential unit
shall be responsible for the payment of a charge of Forty-eight
Dollars ($48.00) per year for solid waste collection and disposal
service per residential unit .

.

.

. (b) The rates and charges

specified by Section (a) herein shall be billed to the owners of
each and every residential unit provided, that upon application by
the occupant of any residential unit, filed with the Director of
Finance and accompanied by an appropriate affidavit showing the
occupant's status as such, such bills may be rendered to the
occupant . . ." does not exceed the grant of authority given to

municipalities in this State by the legislature in W.Va. Code,
8-13-13 [1971],
which provides, in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any charter provisions to the contrary, every
municipality which furnishes any essential or special municipal
service, including . .. the collection and disposal of garbage,

refuse, waste, ashes, trash and any other similar matter, shall have
plenary power and authority to provide by ordinance for the
installation, continuance, maintenance or improvement of such
service, to make reasonable regulations with respect thereto, and
to impose by ordinance upon the users of such service reasonable
rates, fees and charges to be collected in the manner specified in
the ordinance ....1554

1552

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1553

284 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va.1981).

1554

Id. at Syl. (alterations in original).
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The case of Hare v. City of Wheeling 555 required Justice McHugh to
determine the validity of ordinances that imposed a police service fee on residents
based upon the value of their real property. Justice McHugh held that
[w]here certain ordinances of the City of Wheeling impose upon
owners of property a police service charge based upon the value of
property, as determined from the land books and personal property
books of the Ohio County Assessor, such ordinances impose, in
fact, an ad valorem tax upon property, and where, without regard
to the police service charge, property within the City of Wheeling
is taxed to the maximum amount permitted under W.Va. Const.,
art. X, § 1, known as the "Tax Limitation Amendment," and
W.Va. Code, 11-8-6d [1949], such ordinances violate that
55 5
constitutional provision.
The decision in Rhodes v. Malden Public Service District 557 called upon
Justice McHugh to address fees imposed by a public service district. The court held
initially:
W.Va. Code, 16-13A-9 [1965], provides, inter alia, public service
districts with the power to require connection between public
service district sewer facilities and certain houses, dwellings or
buildings of property owners, tenants or occupants, and such
owners, tenants or occupants have a duty under that statute to pay
rates and charges for the district sewer facilities from and155after the
date of receipt of notice that such facilities are available.
Justice McHugh then turned to the specific facts of Rhodes and held that
[i]n the absence of receipt of notice by the owner, tenant or
occupant of a garage apartment that public service district sewer
facilities are available with respect to that garage apartment, a
public service district, under W.Va. Code, 16-13A-9 [1965], is
without authority to impose charges and a lien against that
dwelling for sewer services, even though the garage apartment is
located upon a lot containing another dwelling which is properly
subject to district sewer service charges. 559

1555
1556

298 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at Syl.

1557

301 S.E.2d 601 (W. Va. 1983).

1558

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1559

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Justice McHugh determined in City of Huntington v. Bacon1560 that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 18-5-9 [1933], a county board of
education is authorized to pay a municipal service fee imposed by
a municipality for fire and flood protection services pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 8-13-13 [1971] in order to protect the health of its
pupils and 1in
order to keep its school grounds and buildings in
561
good order.
E.

Property Tax Assessment

Justice McHugh outlined the procedure for challenging a property tax
assessment in the case of State ex rel. Ayers v. Cline.1562 The court held that

[t]he statutory scheme for relief from an excessive property tax
assessment is for an owner of real property contesting the assessed
value thereof to pay the tax assessment under protest, to appeal to
circuit court and if the assessment is reduced, to obtain a refund of
the overpayment. Payment may be withheld during an appeal in
such a case only until the date of the sheriff's sale, or, at the very
latest, until563the end of the redemption period after such sale has
occurred.'

The court in Ayers also ruled that "[tlhe statutory method of paying a

property tax assessment under protest pending judicial review of the assessed value
of real property is an adequate remedy at law precluding
an injunction of a sheriff's
564
sale of real property for nonpayment of taxes."1
In the case of Petition of Maple Meadow Mining Co. for Relieffrom Real
PropertyAssessmentfor Tax Year 1992,1565 Justice McHugh held that

W.Va. Code, 11-lC-7(d) [1990] authorizes the tax commissioner
to approve and a county assessor to adopt a valuation plan which
"would permit the placement of proportionately uniform
percentage changes in values on the books that estimate the
percentage difference between the current assessed value and sixty
percent of the fair market value for classes or identified
sub-classes of property and distribute the change between the two
1560

473 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 1996).

1561

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

1562

342 S.E.2d 89 (W. Va. 1985).

1563

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1564

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1565

446 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1994).
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tax years preceding the tax year beginning on [July 1, 1993]."
This method of valuation may be used in addition to or in lieu of
placing individual values on the books at sixty percent of value.
The goal of this provision is to ensure that all properties, whether
it be properties revaluated by the county assessor, the board of
public works or the state tax commissioner, reach the standard
assessment rate of sixty percent of the fair market 1566
value by July 1,
1993, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 11-1C-1(d) [1990].
F.

B & 0 Tax Credit

Justice McHugh stated in Brockway Glass Co., Glassware Division v.
Cary11567 that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 11-13C-5 [1969], a taxpayer who sells
qualified investment property is entitled to the former business
and occupation tax credit for industrial expansion for the year of
sale, and the successor who continues to operate the business is
entitled only to the remaining amount of
the available credit for
15 68
each year subsequent to the year of sale.
G.

Sheriff s Tax Sale

The case of Geibel v. Clark156 9 called upon Justice McHugh to restrict the
retroactive application of prior precedent handed down by the United States
Supreme Court. The court said:
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct.
2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), the constitutional due process
teachings of which this Court followed in Lilly v. Duke, 180
W.Va. 228, 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988), is not to be applied with
general retroactive effect to invalidate virtually all sheriffs' tax
sales of real property, with mere constructive notice, which were
conducted before Mennonite Board of Missions was decided on
June 22, 1983. General retroactive application of Mennonite
Board of Missions would have severely disruptive effects on land
titles in this state.' 57 °

1566

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

1567

394 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1990).

1568

Id at Syl.

1569

408 S.E.2d 84 (W. Va. 1991).

1570

Id.at Syl. Pt. 1.
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ConsumerSale, Service and Use Tax
Justice McHugh held in Tony P. Sellitti Construction Co. v. Caryl157' that
[t]he former consumers sales and service tax and use tax
regulations excluding "speculative builders" from the former
consumers sales and service tax and use tax statutory exemptions
for purchases of services, machinery, supplies and materials
directly used or consumed in the business of "contracting," W.Va.
Code, 11-15-9(6) [1974] and W.Va. Code, 11-15A-3(3) [1969],
1572
were valid and enforceable during the time they were in effect.
The court also held that
[t]he former consumers sales and service tax and use tax
exemptions for purchases of services, machinery, supplies and
materials directly used or consumed in the business of
"contracting," W.Va. Code, 11-15-9(6) [1974] and W.Va. Code,
11-15A-3(3) [1969], did not deny equal protection to "speculative
builders" insofar as these statutory tax exemptions were
interpreted as excluding "speculative builders" from the
"contracting" classification. 573
Tax Exemption
In New Vrindaban Community, Inc. v. Rose,'574 Justice McHugh stated that
[w]here a question of taxability arises under W. Va. Code, 11-3-25
[1967], and such question involves the constitutionality of a
statute granting exemption from taxation, the matter shall be heard
de novo by the circuit court before this Court will pass on the
constitutionality of the statute granting the exemption. 1575

J.

Tax Assessment of Coal

Justice McHugh created a presumption of validity of coal tax assessments
in the case of Western PocahontasProperties,Ltd. v. County Commission of Wetzel

1571
1572

408 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1573

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1574

419 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va. 1992).

1575

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.
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County.1 "t The court held that

[a]s a general rule, there is a presumption that valuations for
taxation purposes fixed by an assessor are correct. Thus, a tax
assessment of coal property will be presumed to be correct when
the assessor, in assessing the coal property: (1) relies upon the
legislative rules prescribing the methods by which property is to
be assessed; and (2) uses, as a guide, information furnished by the
tax department, such as a list of comparable sales of similar
property. The burden is on the taxpayer challenging the
assessment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the tax assessment is erroneous. 57
K.

Tax Refund
Justice McHugh wrote in Doran & Associates, Inc. v. Paige57 8 that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 11-10-14(1 )(1) [1978], a taxpayer who
receives an extension of time to file a tax return and who
subsequently claims to be entitled to a refund shall file such claim
for refund within three years after the date the return was due to be
filed pursuant to the extension of time to file.1 79

L.

PersonalProperty Tax

Justice McHugh determined whether a specific item constituted personal
property for tax purposes in Ohio CellularRSA Ltd. Partnershipv. Board of Public
Works of State of West Virginia.158 The court held as follows:
"Personal property" which is defined in W.Va. Code, 11-5-3
[1961] as 'all fixtures attached to land...; all things of value,
moveable and tangible, which are the subjects of ownership; all
chattels, real and personal; all notes, bonds, and accounts
receivable, stocks and other intangible property[J' does not
include within its definition an FCC license which authorizes a
person to provide cellular communication services. Thus, an FCC
license authorizing a person to provide cellular communication
services is not personal property which is subject to assessment

1576

431 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1993).

157n
1578

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
464 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1995).

1579

Id at Syl.

1580

481 S.E.2d 722 (W. Va. 1996).
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for personal property tax purposes under W.Va. Code, 11-6-7(e)
[1986].1581

XXIV. PROBATE LAW

A.

Constructionof Will

Justice McHugh relied upon the decision in Couch v. Eastham1
deciding the case of Keller v. Keller.'5 a The court in Keller held that

2

in

[w]hen the will affords no satisfactory clue to the real intentions
of the testator, the court must from necessity resort to legal
presumptions and rules of construction. But such rules yield to the
intention of the testator apparent in the will, and have no
application when the intention thus appears.1 58
B.

Codicil to Will

Justice McHugh determined the effect of a codicil to a will in Bank of
Raleigh v. Thompson.15 85 The opinion held that
[a]lthough a testatrix provided in a will for the bequest of the
corpus of the trust to the Kansas City College of Osteopathy, now
the University of Health Sciences, upon the death of the life estate
beneficiaries, language used by the testatrix in a codicil to that
will, "Money that was to be given as stated in the will to the
Kansas City College . . . shall be given to West Virginia
Osteopath shall be the amount of $1,500.00 ... each year to the

college to be used in a scholarship for a worthy student[,]" and
subsequent use of the language, "Money is to be willed to my
sister Macie Teter Williams.

.

." evidences the testatrix's intent to

alter the initial bequest in her will by bequeathing a sum sufficient
to generate $1500 annually to the West Virginia School of
Osteopathic Medicine for scholarship purposes while providing a
residuary bequest of the corpus1586of the trust to the named
beneficiary, Macie Teter Williams.
1581
1582

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alterations in original).
3 S.E. 23 (W. Va. 1987).

1584

287 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at Syl.

1585

351 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1986).

1586

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alterations in original).

1583
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